Case Study / 2026
Turion SSO: Self-Hosted OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Identity Provider & SDK
RFC-compliant OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect Identity Provider enforcing PKCE S256, single-use authorization codes with replay auto-revocation, TOTP MFA, and a Node.js SDK.
S256 Mandatory
PKCE Enforcement
Rejects plain or missing challenges
Auto-Revoke
Code Replay Defense
Revokes full grant on 2nd exchange
JWKS Offline
Token Verification
SPs validate JWT without IdP bottleneck
TOTP MFA
Auth Hardening
Bcrypt cost 12 + backup codes
problem
Eliminating Duplicate Auth Silos & Third-Party Lock-In
Maintaining separate user databases and login flows per product creates security policy drift and user friction, while hosted identity vendors introduce per-MAU pricing unpredictability and external custody over session logs.
architecture
OIDC Authorization Code Flow with PKCE & JWKS
interactive diagram
OIDC Authorization Code Flow with PKCE & JWKS
Exposes standard discovery (/.well-known/openid-configuration), enforces confidential client auth plus PKCE S256, verifies id_token signatures via JWKS through the ridhuan-sso SDK, and records every security event in PostgreSQL.
results
Security Guarantees Delivered
Delivered unified login across heterogeneous tech stacks, exact-match redirect URI enforcement, replay-attack grant revocation, and complete developer onboarding documentation.
Architecture Decisions
ADR 1 / accepted
Revoke All Issued Tokens on Authorization Code Replay
If an intercepted authorization code is replayed within its 5-minute TTL, merely returning 400 leaves already-issued tokens active.
Follow RFC 6749 section 4.1.2 guidance: mark consumed codes in Redis and revoke all descendant access and refresh tokens if a second exchange attempt occurs.
